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Abstract
In Stackelberg security games, a defender seeks to randomly allocate limited security resources to pro-
tect critical targets from an attack. In this paper, we study a fundamental, yet underexplored, phenomenon
in security games, which we term the Curse of Correlation (CoC). Specifically, we observe that there
are inevitable correlations among the protection status of different targets. Such correlation is a crucial
concern, especially in spatio-temporal domains like conservation area patrolling, where attackers can
surveil patrollers at certain areas and then infer their patrolling routes using such correlations. To mitigate
this issue, we propose to design entropy-maximizing defending strategies for spatio-temporal security
games, which frequently suffer from CoC. We prove that the problem is #P-hard in general. However, it
admits efficient algorithms in well-motivated special settings. Our experiments show significant advan-
tages of max-entropy algorithms over previous algorithms. A scalable implementation of our algorithm is
currently under pre-deployment testing for integration into FAMS software to improve the scheduling of
US federal air marshals.
1 Introduction
The security game is played between a defender and an attacker where the defender’s goal is to randomly
allocate a limited number of security resources to protect targets from attack [28, 7, 34]. Standard models
assume that the attacker only knows the defender’s randomized strategy, but is oblivious to the sampled real-
time allocation. However, this assumption may fail since in many situations the attacker can partially observe
the defender’s real-time allocation. Such partial observation can be utilized to infer extra information about
the overall strategy. This is particularly the case in games played out in space and time, a.k.a. spatio-temporal
security games, which are also the primary focus of this work. For example, it has been reported that in
wildlife protection domains, some poachers partially monitor rangers’ patrolling activities and then make
their poaching plans based on their observations [25, 24]. Similar issues could happen when optimizing the
patrolling on graphs [2, 6] and randomized scheduling of air marshals [1].
We observe that the randomized allocation of limited security resources creates inherent correlations
within protection statuses of different targets – the coverage of some targets implies that other targets are
not protected. Such correlation allows the attacker to utilize his partial observation at some targets to infer
information about other targets’ protection status, a phenomenon which we term the Curse of Correlation
(CoC). We prove that such correlation is inevitable, and may cause significant loss if not addressed properly.
The ideal approach for mitigating CoC is to come up with an accurate model to capture the attacker’s partial
observations – which is also called an information leakage model [33] – and then compute the optimal
defender strategy tailored specifically to this leakage model. For example, one possibility is to model the
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interaction as an extensive-form game and then solve the game. However, we argue that this approach
suffers from several critical drawbacks: 1. lack of accurate leakage models in practice; 2. limited scalability;
3. vulnerability to the attacker’s strategic manipulations. These barriers motivate our adoption of a more
robust (though inevitably more conservative) approach. Particularly, we propose to adopt the “most random”
defending strategy, or more formally, the strategy that, subject to optimizing the usual objective under required
constraints, maximizes (Shannon) entropy. Intuitively, such a strategy could be resistant to partial leakage
due to its extreme randomness/unpredictability.
To that end, this paper offers the following contributions. First, we formally study the Curse of Cor-
relation (CoC) phenomenon in security games and illustrate the importance of handling CoC, particularly
in spatio-temporal domains. Second, we propose to adopt the defending strategy with maximum entropy
and illustrates its advantages when compared to the idealized optimal solution tailored to a specific leakage
model. Experiments show that our approach is close to the idealized optimality but are more robust to
leakage model misspecification and attacker’s strategic manipulations. Third, we design novel algorithms
to sample defending strategies with maximum entropy in spatio-temporal security games. We prove that
the exact max-entropy defending strategy is #P-hard to compute in general, but admits polynomial-time
algorithms in well-motivated special settings as well as efficient heuristic algorithms. Experiments show that
our algorithms are far more scalable than the idealized optimal approach. Notably, a scalable implementation
of our algorithm is currently under pre-deployment testing for integration into the Federal Air Marshal
Service (FAMS) software to improve the scheduling of US federal air marshals.
Related Work. Most relevant to ours is the recent work of [33], which focuses on a basic security setting
with no spatio-temporal structures, no scheduling constraints and a specific information leakage model,
i.e., only one target leaks information. Despite such simplifications, they prove that computing the optimal
defender strategy is NP-hard, and proposes an exponential-time algorithm. Our work differs from [33] in two
key aspects. First, [33] raises the issue of information leakage in security games whereas we argue that the
reason that information leakage hurts the defender is the underlying correlation among targets and, more
importantly, formally prove that such correlation is inevitable. This is also why we term the phenomenon
the curse of correlation. Second, the security settings we consider in this paper are more complicated with
spatio-temporal structures, scheduling constraints1 and more leaking targets, thus is even more intractable.
We are not aware of any efficient way to extend and adapt the (already exponential-time) algorithm in [33] to
our setting.
Alon et al. [3] study information leakage in normal-form zero-sum games and illustrate the difficulty of
handling leakage by exhibiting NP-hardness results in several model variants. However, the specific leakage
models in [3] do not directly fit into the security game applications we consider. In principle, the leakage
problem can also be represented as an extensive-form game (EFG) and there has been significant progress in
solving general-purpose large EFGs recently [23, 9, 11, 12]. However, we did not take this approach because
the size of information sets in our game increases exponentially in the number of security resources, time
steps and possibly leaking targets. This very quickly makes our problem intractable (see more discussions
in later sections). This work also relates to the line of research on adversarial patrolling games (APGs)
[2, 6, 10, 4, 32]. Our discussion here cannot cover the rich body of work on APGs; We refer curious readers to
[6] for a good overview. APGs also consider the attacker’s real-time observations, however our settings differ
from APGs in several aspects: 1. the defender in APGs typically has only one patroller and the attacker has
full knowledge of the defender’s movements, while in our setting the defender has many security resources
and the attacker can only observe a small subset of targets; 2. APGs assume that the attacker takes time to
complete an attack, while attacks in our setting are instantaneous. These important differences make the
algorithms for APGs inapplicable to our settings.
1Such scheduling constraints are crucial for important applications in many domains such as FAMS, wildlife conservation, coast
guard patrolling, etc.
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2 Preliminaries
The security game is played between a defender and an attacker. The defender aims to use limited security
resources to protect n targets, denoted by set [n], from the attacker’s attack. Any defender pure strategy
S ⊆ [n] is a subset of targets that can be feasibly covered by the security resources. A more convenient
representation of S is a binary vector s = (s1, ..., sn)T ∈ {0, 1}n, indicating whether each target is covered
or not. We will use S or s interchangeably throughout, and the meaning should be clear from the context. Let
S denote the set of all defender pure strategies, whose size is typically exponential in the game representation
[28]. For example, S could consist of all subsets of [n] of a fixed size, which corresponds to the setting of no
resource allocation constraints. However, in reality, S usually has more structures due to resource allocation
constraints. A defender mixed strategy is a distribution p over S . The attacker pure strategy is a target i ∈ [n]
which he chooses to attack. The concrete payoff structure of the game is not particularly important for the
purpose of this paper. We only mention that, given that target i is attacked, the defender and attacker both get
a utility depending on its importance and marginal protection probability, described below.
Marginal Probabilities and Implementability. For any defender mixed strategy p,
∑
s∈S ps · si = xi ∈
[0, 1] is the marginal (coverage) probability of target i. Let x = (x1, ...xn)T =
∑
s∈S ps · s ∈ [0, 1]n be the
marginal vector of all targets. In this case, we say that mixed strategy p implements marginal vector x, and x
is implementable (by p). Not every x ∈ [0, 1]n is implementable – all the implementable x’s form a polytope
conv(S), i.e., the convex hull of S.
There are generally many mixed strategies that implement the same marginal vector. Due to the concern
of computational efficiency, most algorithms for security games are designed to compute a mixed strategy of
small support, which is evidently a poor choice in the presence of attacker surveillance. A primary goal of
this paper is to design mixed strategies that are robust to attacker partial observations. Next, we describe a
particular implementation for a marginal vector.
The Max-Entropy Implementation. Given any implementable x, the max-entropy implementation of x is
the mixed strategy p of the maximum (Shannon) entropy among all mixed strategies that implement x. More
precisely, the max-entropy implementation of x is the optimal solution to the following convex program (CP)
with variables pS .
maximize −∑S∈S pS log(pS)
subject to
∑
S∈S:i∈S pS = xi, for i ∈ [n].∑
S∈S pS = 1
pS ≥ 0, for S ∈ S.
(1)
An obvious challenge of solving CP (1) is that the optimal p∗ typically has exponentially large support,
thus cannot even be written down explicitly in polynomial time. It turns out that this can be overcome via
algorithms that efficiently samples a set S “on the fly”. Therefore, we say an algorithm solves CP (1) if it
takes x as input and randomly samples S ∈ S with probability p∗S where p∗ is the optimal solution to CP (1).
It turns out that we can sample the max-entropy implementation in polynomial time as long as we can solve
the following generalized counting problem over S .
Definition 2.1 (Generalized Counting). Given any α ∈ Rn+, compute C(α) =
∑
S∈S αS , where αS =∏
i∈S αi.
Note that C(1) equals precisely the cardinality of S; More generally, C(α) is a weighted count of the
elements in S with weights αS =
∏
i∈S αi.
Lemma 2.2. (Adapted from [27]) The max-entropy implementation of any x ∈ conv(S) can be sampled in
polynomial time if and only if the generalized counting problem over S can be solved in polynomial time.
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As a result of Lemma 2.2, to sample the max-entropy implementation of any marginal vector x, we
only need to design a generalized counting algorithm for S. However, we do remark that this does not
magically simplify the problem since the generalized counting problem is computationally intractable for
most combinatorial problems. In fact, very few efficient algorithms are known, and the problem is #P-hard
even for counting simple combinatorial structures like perfect bipartite matchings [31].
3 The Curse of Correlation and A Remedy by Entropy Maximization
In this section we illustrate how the attacker can first observe the protection status of a small set of targets
and then utilize correlations to infer the protection of other targets. To do so, the attacker does not even need
full knowledge of the defender’s mixed strategy. Instead he only needs to know the correlations among the
observed targets and other ones.
3.1 Hacking Security Games with One Bit of Information.
Our example is described in the setting of conservation area protection, though we emphasize that the
phenomenon it illustrates could occur in any security setting. The problem concerns designing rangers’
patrolling schedules within a fixed time period, say, a day. This is usually modeled by discretizing the area
into cells as well as discretizing the time. At the top of Figure 1, we depict a concrete example with 4
cells to be protected at 3 time layers: morning, noon and afternoon. The numbers around each cell is the
desired marginal coverage probabilities for each cell at each time (color thickness depicts the probability
density). The defender has 2 rangers, and seeks to randomize their patrolling to achieve the required marginal
probabilities. 0.3 0.70.3 0.7 0.6 0.40.7 0.3 0.7 0.70.3 0.3
0.4 0.3
0.3
morning noon afternoon
One	  possible	  implementation	  of	  
the	  marginal	  probabilities	  above.
Strategy	  1:	   Strategy	  2:	  
Strategy	  3:	  
Figure 1: Marginal Probabilities and Their Implementation.
To deploy a mixed strategies of small support, as done by traditional algorithms, one can implement
the marginal vector by mixing the three pure strategies listed at the bottom of Figure 1 (filled dots are fully
covered). Unfortunately, it turns out that such an implementation is extremely vulnerable to the attacker’s
partial surveillance. For example, if the attacker can surveil the status of the top-left cell in the morning
(i.e., the one with dashed boundary) and prepare an attack in the afternoon, he can always find a completely
uncovered cell to attack. Specifically, if the dashed cell is covered, this means Strategy 3 is deployed and
two particular cells are uncovered in the afternoon; Otherwise, either Strategy 1 or 2 is deployed, thus the
bottom left cell is uncovered in the afternoon for sure. So the attacker successfully identifies uncovered cells
in the afternoon by monitoring only one cell in the morning.
The issue above is due to the inherent correlation among the protection status of different targets when
allocating a limited number of resources. Particularly, the coverage of some targets must imply that some
other targets are unprotected. The example illustrates how the attacker can take advantage of such correlation
4
and infer a significant amount of information about the protection of other targets by monitoring even a single
target. This is what we term the Curse of Correlation (CoC) in security games. The following Proposition 3.1
illustrates this phenomenon in a more formal sense.
We begin with a few notations. Recall that any mixed strategy p is a distribution over S . Equivalently, we
can view a mixed strategy as a random binary vector X = (X1, ..., Xn) ∈ {0, 1}n satisfying Pr(X = s) =
ps. Here, Xi ∈ {0, 1} denotes the random protection status of target i, and Pr(Xi = 1) = xi is the marginal
coverage probability. For any Xi, let H(Xi) = xi log xi + (1− xi) log(1− xi) denote its Shannon entropy.
Note that, Xi’s are correlated. Let Xi|Xk denote Xi conditioned on Xk and H(Xi|Xk) denote its conditional
entropy. We say target k is trivial if Pr(Xk = 1) = 0 or 1; Otherwise, k is non-trivial. Obviously, the attacker
infers no information about other targets by monitoring a trivial target. The following proposition shows that
if any non-trivial target k is monitored, the attacker can always infer information about the protection of other
targets.2
Proposition 3.1. For any non-trivial target k, we have
EXk
[∑
i 6=k
H(Xi|Xk)
]
<
∑
i 6=k
H(Xi)
.
Proof. Let Pr(Xi = 1|Xk = 1) = x1i and Pr(Xi = 1|Xk = 0) = x0i . Since EXk [Pr(Xi = 1|Xk)] =
Pr(Xi = 1) = xi, we have xi = x1i · Pr(Xk = 1) + x0i · Pr(Xk = 0). Since H(Xi) is strictly concave
w.r.t. xi, we have
E
Xk
H(Xi|Xk) ≥ H(Xi). (2)
Summing over all i 6= k, we get∑i∈[n]:i 6=k EXk H(Xi|Xk) ≥∑i∈[n]:i 6=kH(Xi). We now argue that the “="
cannot hold. Prove by contradiction. Note that target i is non-trivial, thereforePr(Xk) 6= 0, 1. SinceH(Xi)’s
are strictly concave, if the “=" holds, then we must have Pr(Xi = 1|Xk = 1) = Pr(Xi = 1|Xk = 0) = xi
for any i 6= k. However, this implies that target i is trivial, i.e., i is either fully protected or unprotected.
Otherwise, there must exist some j 6= i such that the marginal probability of j will be different between the
circumstances that i is protected and not protected. This concludes the proof.
Proposition 3.1 shows that, conditioned on Xk, the entropy sum of all other Xi’s strictly decreases in
expectation. Therefore, the correlations among targets are intrinsic and inevitable.
Dilemma of Traditional Algorithms. Traditional security game algorithms, e.g., comb sampling [29] and
strategy/column generation [19, 8], are designed to generate mixed strategies of small support for the sake of
computational efficiency. Unfortunately, such small-support mixed strategies typically induce high correlation
among the protection status of targets, and thus exacerbate the curse of correlation. This is illustrated by the
above example as well as in our later experiments.
3.2 Why Maximizing Entropy?
To tackle the curse of correlation in security games, the ideal approach is to come up with an accurate model
to capture the attacker’s partial observation (also referred to as an information leakage model henceforth for
convenience), and then solve the model to obtain the defender’s optimal defending strategy. For example, one
natural choice is to represent the problem as an extensive-form game (EFG) since information sets in EFGs
naturally capture what the attacker knows at each time step. However we argue that these approaches suffer
from several critical drawbacks.
2Here we assume that all resources are fully used, and do not consider the (unreasonable) situations in which certain security
resources are sometimes underused or idle.
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I. Unavailability of an Accurate Leakage Model. The attacker’s choice of target monitoring depends
on many hidden factors, thus is highly unpredictable. Therefore, it is typically very difficult to know
which targets are leaking information – otherwise the defender could have resolved the issue in the first
place via other approaches. As a result, it is usually not possible to obtain an accurate leakage model.
However, as we will illustrates in our experiments, optimizing over an inaccurate leakage model can
even be harmful to the defender compared to doing nothing.
II. Scalability and Computational Barriers. Even if the defender has an accurate leakage model,
computing the optimal defender strategy against the leakage model is intractable generally. As we
mentioned in the related work, even in the simplest possible model – zero-sum games, no spatio-
temporal structures, no scheduling constraints and a single target leaking information– computing the
optimal defender strategy is NP-hard [33]. Obviously, the problem only becomes more difficult in
our (more complicated) spatio-temporal settings with scheduling constraints. If we adopt the EFG
representation, the size of the information sets increases exponentially in the number of time steps,
number of patrollers and possible leaking targets. For example, a game with 9 targets, 9 time units
and 2 patrollers has O(918 · 29) information sets, which cannot be solved by any state-of-the-art EFG
solvers. However, our algorithm can compute the max-entropy implementation for such an instance in
a few seconds in our experiments.
III. Vulnerability to Attacker’s Strategic Manipulations. Another concern about any optimal
solution tailored to a specific leakage model is that such a solution may be easily “gamed” by the attacker.
In particular, the optimal solution naturally biases towards the leaking targets by assigning more security
forces to these targets. This however opens the door for the attacker to strategically manipulate the
defender’s belief on leaking targets, e.g., by intentionally spreading misleading information, with the
goal of shifting the defender’s defense away from the attacker’s prime targets. As we show in our
experiments, this could cause significant loss to the defender.
Entropy maximization – a more robust solution. These barriers motivate our adoption of a more robust
(though inevitably more conservative) approach. Particularly, we propose to first compute the optimal
defender strategy assuming no leakage and then adopt the max-entropy implementation of its marginal
vector. Our choice of max entropy is due to at least three reasons. First, the max-entropy strategy is the
most random, thus unpredictable, defender strategy. When the defender is uncertain about which target is
leaking information (the setting we are in), we believe that taking the most random strategy is one natural
choice. Second, the max-entropy distribution exhibits substantial approximate stochastic independence
among the protection statuses of targets3, so that the protection status of any leaking targets does not carry
much information about that of others. Third, as we will illustrate in Section 6, empirically, our max entropy
approach performs extremely well in comparisons with several other alternatives; in fact, in some settings,
it achieves a solution quality that is even close to the optimal defender utility under no leakage! Given
such significant empirical results, entropy maximization clearly stood out as a powerful approach to address
information leakage.
From a practical perspective, the max-entropy approach also enjoys several advantages. First, it does not
require a concrete leakage model. Instead, it seeks to reduce the overall correlation among the statuses of
all targets, thus serves as a robust solution. Second, this approach is easily “compatible" with any current
deployed security systems since it does not require any change to previously deployed algorithms while
only adds additional randomness (in some sense, this is a strictly better solution than previous ones). This is
particularly useful in domains where re-building a new security system is not feasible or too costly.
3This is widely observed in practice, and also theoretically proved in some settings, e.g., matchings [21].
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Efficient computation remains a challenge for our approach due to the widely-known difficulty of
computing the max-entropy distribution over combinatorial structures. Fortunately, we show in the next two
sections that they admit efficient algorithms in several important and well-motivated security settings, as well
as good heuristics in general.
4 Efficient Max-Entropy Implementation for Spatio-Temporal Security Games
In many applications, e.g., wildlife protection, the security game is played out in space and time [5, 17, 34],
which is termed the spatio-temporal security game. In these domains, the defender needs to move patrollers
as time goes on. Due to the correlation among the patroller’s consecutive moves, these games are more
likely to suffer from CoC. In this section, we seek to mitigate CoC by entropy maximization. In particular,
given any marginal vector (obtainable from any algorithm solving the original game), we seek to sample its
max-entropy implementation.
Like most previous work, we focus on discretized spatio-temporal security games. Such a game is
described by a T ×N grid graph
time
space
4
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1 2 3 4 𝑇
.	  .	  .	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  5
5
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Figure 2: Structure of a Spatio-Temporal Security Game
G = (V,E) indicating a problem with N cells and T time layers (see Figure 2). We use vt,i to denote
a grid node, representing cell i at time t. Each vt,i is treated as a target, so there are n = T × N targets.
The directed edges between each consecutive time layers denote the patroller’s feasible moves between cells
within consecutive time layers. Such feasibility usually incorporates speed limit, terrain and other real-world
constraints. Figure 2 depicts some feasible moves between time layer 1 and 2. A feasible patrol path is a
path in G starting from time 1 and ends at time T (e.g., the dashed path in Figure 2). Note that there are
exponentially many patrol paths. We assume that the defender has k homogeneous patrollers, so a defender
pure strategy corresponds to the set of nodes covered by k feasible patrol paths. We start by proving that the
max-entropy implementation problem for spatio-temporal security games is computationally hard.
Theorem 4.1. It is #P-hard to sample the max-entropy implementation for spatio-temporal security games
even when there are two time layers.
Proof. When there are two time steps, the game structure corresponds to a bipartite graph (T = 2 in Figure
2). It is important to notice that a pure strategy here does not simply correspond to a bipartite matching
of size k, therefore we cannot reduce from the problem of counting size-k matchings. This is because the
selected k edges are allowed to share nodes. Moreover, our definition of a pure strategy is the set of covered
targets, while not the edges themselves. In fact, sometimes one pure strategy can be achieved by different set
of k edges.
To prove the theorem, we reduce from the problem of counting bases of a transversal matroid, which is
known to be #P-complete [13]. Given any bipartite graph G = (L∪R,E) with |L| = k, |R| = n and k ≤ n,
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any set T ⊆ R is an independent set of the transversal matroidM(G) of G if there exists a matching of size
|T | in the subgraph induced by L ∪ T ; Such a T is a base if |T | = |L| = k.
Given any bipartite graph G = (L ∪ R,E) with k = |L| ≤ |R| = n, we reduce counting bases of
the transversal matroidM(G) to the max-entropy implementation for the two-time-layer spatio-temporal
security games on graph G.4 Let S2k denote the set of pure strategies that cover exactly 2k nodes. We first
reduce counting bases ofM(G) to counting S2k. This simply because if a pure strategy covers 2k nodes, it
must cover all k nodes in L and another k nodes in R, and these 2k nodes are matchable. It is not hard to see
that elements in S2k andM(G) are in one-to-one correspondence.
Since counting reduces to generalized counting, we finally reduce generalized counting over set S2k to
max-entropy implementation of the following special subset of marginal vectors X2k = {x ∈ [0, 1]k+n :
x1,i = 1,∀i ∈ L;
∑n
i=1 x2,i = k}. It is easy to see that any mixed strategy that matches a marginal vector
x ∈ X2k must support on S2k. Therefore, when considering max-entropy implementation of any x ∈ X2k,
we can w.l.o.g. restrict the set of pure strategies to be S2k. By Lemma 2.2, generalized counting over S2k
reduce to max-entropy implementation for any x ∈ X2k.
Theorem 4.1 suggests that it is unlikely that there is an efficient algorithm for the max-entropy implemen-
tation problem in general. Moreover, there is no known polynomial size compact formulation for computing
the max-entropy distribution, thus we cannot utilize the state-of-the-art optimization software to tackle the
problem. Nevertheless, we show that the max-entropy approach, termed MaxEn henceforth, can be efficiently
implemented in two well-motivated special settings.
4.1 MaxEn for Setting 1: Small Number of Patrollers
In many applications, the defender only possesses a small number of patrollers. For example, in wildlife
protection, the defender usually has only one or two patrol teams at each patrol post [16]; the US Coast
Guard uses two patrollers to protect Staten Island ferries [17]. In this section, we show that when the number
of patrollers is small (i.e., can be treated as a constant), the max entropy implementation can be sampled
efficiently.
Theorem 4.2. When the number of patrollers is a constant, there is poly(N,T ) time algorithm for the
max-entropy implementation in spatio-temporal security games.
Proof. Theorem 4.2 is proved by developing an efficient algorithm for the generalized counting version of
the problem (which is all we need to sample a max-entropy implementation by Lemma 2.2). For ease of
presentation, our description focuses on the case with two patrollers, though it easily generalizes to a constant
number of patrollers. We propose a dynamic program (DP) that exploits the natural chronological order of
the targets along the temporal dimension.5
Let us call a pure strategy 2-path, since each of the two patrollers takes a path on G. Our goal is to
compute the weighted count of all 2-paths in grid graph G, each weighted by the product of the node weights
it traverses. Our goal is to compute the weighted count of combinations of two paths in G (one for each
patroller), where the weight is the product of the node weights that the two paths traverse. Let {αt,i}t∈[T ],i∈[n]
be any given weight set. Obviously, the counting problem is easy if T = 1, i.e., only one time layer. Our
key observation is that the solution for T = t can be constructed by utilizing the solutions for T = t − 1.
Particularly, for any 1 ≤ i ≤ j ≤ N , we use DP(i, j; t) to denote the solution to the counting problem
restricted to the truncated graph with only time layers 1, 2, .., t, and satisfies that the two patroller must end at
4Though the definition of spatio-temporal security games requires that each time layer has the same number of nodes, this
requirement is not essential since one can always add isolated nodes to each time layer to equalize the number of nodes.
5Dynamic programming is widely used in counting problems. See, e.g., [14, 15] as well as the remarks in [30]. The novel parts
usually lie at careful analysis of the problem to uncover the proper structure for DP.
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cell i, j at time t. Observe that DP(i, j; 1) = α1,iα1,j when i 6= j and DP(i, i; 1) = α1,i. We remark that
our algorithm description in the main section intentionally “omitted" the trivial conner case of i = j for ease
of presentation. We then use the following update rule for t ≥ 2: DP(i, j; t) ={
αt,iαt,j ·
∑
(i′,j′)∈pre(i,j)DP(i
′, j′; t− 1) if i < j
αt,i ·
∑
(i′,j′)∈pre(i,j)DP(i
′, j′; t− 1) if i = j
where pre = {(i′, j′) : i′ ≤ j′ s.t. vt−1,i′ , vt−1,j′ can reach vt,i, vt,j } is essentially the set of all pairs of
nodes that can reach vt,i, vt,j . Note that the solution to the generalized counting problem is
∑
i≤j DP(i, j;T ).
The correctness of the algorithm follows from the observation that if the two patrollers are at vt,i and vt,j ,
they must come from vt−1,i′ and vt−1,j′ for certain (i′, j′) ∈ pre(i, j). The updating rule simply aggregates
all such choices. The algorithm runs in poly(N,T ) time.
4.2 MaxEn for Setting 2: Air Marshal Scheduling
One important task faced by the Federal Air Marshal Service (FAMS) is to schedule air marshals to protect
international flights. In this case, the schedule of each air marshal is a round trip [22], and the game
can be described as a spatio-temporal security game with two time layers. In this section, we show that
the max-entropy implementation can be sampled efficiently in this setting, despite that the #P-hardness in
Theorem 4.1 holds for the case of two time layers. Our algorithm crucially exploits certain “order” structure
of the air marshal’s schedules.
We start by describing the problem. FAMS seeks to allocate k homogeneous air marshals to protect round-
trip international flights originating from certain domestic city to different outside cities. These round-trip
𝐴" 𝐴# 𝐴$ 𝐴% 𝐴& 𝐴' 𝐴( 𝐴) 𝐴*
𝐵" 𝐵# 𝐵$ 𝐵% 𝐵& 𝐶' 𝐶( 𝐶) 𝐶*
Figure 3: Consistent round-trip flights
between a domestic city and two outside
cities.
flights constitute a bipartite graph G = (A ∪B,E) in which
nodes in A [B] correspond to all originating [return] flights;
e = (Ai, Bj) ∈ E iff e forms a consistent round trip. Note
that G is a union of multiple isolated smaller bipartite graphs,
each containing all flights between two cities (see Figure
3). This is because any flight from a to b can never form a
round trip with a flight from c to a. We will call each iso-
lated bipartite graph a component. The following are natural
constraints on the structure of G (which makes the prob-
lem more tractable than general settings): (Ai, Bj) ∈ E
if (1) the destination of Ai is the departure city of Bj ; (2)
the arrival time of Ai, denoted as arr(Ai), and the departure time of Bj , denoted as dep(Bj), satisfy
dep(Bj)− arr(Ai) ∈ [T1, T2] for constants T2 > T1 > 0.
Theorem 4.3. The max-entropy implementation for the FAMS problem with round trips can be sampled in
polynomial time.
Proof of Theorem 4.3
By Lemma 2.2, we only need to design an efficient algorithm for the generalized counting version of
the problem. Let G = (A ∪ B,E) denote the bipartite graph for the air marshal scheduling problem,
|A| = n1, |B| = n2. Recall that G is a union of multiple isolated components, each containing all flights
between a and another city (see Figure 3). Within each component, we sort the flights in A by their arrival
time and flights in B by by their departure time.
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We now show that the generalized counting over the set of defender pure strategies admits a polynomial
time algorithm. Our algorithm crucially exploits the following “order” structure.
Definition 4.4. [Ordered Matching] In a bipartite graph G = (A ∪B,E), a matching M = {e1, ..., ek} is
called an ordered matching if for any edge e = (Ai, Bj) and e′ = (Ai′ , Bj′) in M , either i > i′, j > j′ or
i < i′, j < j′.
Visually, any two edges e, e′ in an ordered matching satisfy that e is either “above” or “below” e′ – they
do not cross.
Since each flight has at most one air marshal, any assignment of air marshals must correspond to a
matching in G. However, a pure strategy S – i.e., a set of covered flights – can be accomplished by
different matchings. For example, the set S = {A1, A2, B1, B2} in Figure 3 can be achieved by the
matching {(A1, B1), (A2, B2)} or the matching {(A1, B2), (A2, B1)}. Nevertheless, only the matching
{(A1, B1), (A2, B2)} is ordered. It turns out that pure strategies and ordered k-matchings are in one-to-one
correspondence.
Lemma 4.5. In the air marshal scheduling problem, there is a way to order flights in A and B so that pure
strategies and size-k ordered matchings are in one-to-one correspondence.
Proof. It is easy to see that any ordered k-matchings corresponds to one pure strategy. We prove the reverse.
Given any pure strategy S consisting of 2k flights, let E˜ = {e1, ..., ek} be any matching that results in S.
We claim that if there exist two edges e, e′ ∈ E˜ with e = (Ai, Bj) and e′ = (Ai′ , Bj′) such that i > i′
and j < j′, then (Ai, Bj′) and (Ai′ , Bj) must also be edges in E. Since e, e′ ∈ E˜, we must have T1 <
dep(Bj)− arr(Ai) < T2 and T1 < dep(Bj′)− arr(Ai′) < T2. Since flights in A are ordered increasingly
by arrival time and flights in B are ordered increasingly by departure time, we have arr(Ai) ≥ arr(Ai′)
and dep(Bj) ≤ dep(Bj′). These inequalities imply dep(Bj′)− arr(Ai) ≤ dep(Bj′)− arr(Ai′) ≤ T2 and
dep(Bj′) − arr(Ai) ≥ dep(Bj) − arr(Ai) ≥ T1, therefore (Ai, Bj′) ∈ E. Similarly, one can show that
(Aj , Bi′) ∈ E.
As a result, we can adjust the matching by using the edges (Ai, Bj′) and (Ai′ , Bj) instead. Such
adjustment can continue until the matching becomes ordered. The procedure will terminate within a finite
time by a simple potential function argument, with potential function f(E˜) =
∑
e=(Ai,Bj)∈E˜ |i − j|2. In
particular, the above adjustment always strictly decreases the potential function since |i− j|2 + |i′ − j′|2 >
|i− j′|2 + |i′ − j|2 if i > i′ and j < j′. The adjustment will terminate with an ordered matching. It is easy
to see that the ordered matching is unique, concluding our proof.
Lemma 4.5 provides a way to reduce generalized counting over the set of pure strategies to generalized
counting of size-k ordered matchings. In particular, given any set of non-negative weights α ∈ Rn1+n2+ , we
define edge weight we = αAiαBj for any e = (Ai, Bj) ∈ E. Therefore, the weight of any pure strategy
equals the weight of the corresponding size-k ordered matching with edge weights we’s. It turns out that
generalized counting of size-k ordered matchings admits an efficient algorithm.
The main idea is to dynamically compute the generalized sum of size-k ordered matchings according
to some “order" of the bipartite graphs. More specifically, define El,r ⊆ E to be the set of edges that are
“under" Al and Br, where Al ∈ A,Br ∈ B. Formally, any e = (Ai, Bj) ∈ E is in El,r iff i ≤ l, j ≤ r. We
build the following dynamic programing table DP(l, r; d) =
∑
M :M⊆El,r,|M |=dwM , in which DP(l, r; d)
is the sum of the weight of all size-d ordered matchings with edges in El,r. Now, to compute DP(l, r; d),
we only need to enumerate all the possibilities of the uppermost edge in the ordered matching, given that
DP(i, j; d)s are known for i < l and j < r. This can be done by a dynamic program (Algorithm 1).
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Algorithm 1 Generalized Counting of Ordered k-Matchings
Input: : G = (A ∪B,E); we ≥ 0 for any e ∈ E.
Output: :
∑
M : |M |=dwM % M is an ordered matching
1: Initialization: DP(l, r; 0) = 1 for l = 0, .., n1, r = 0, .., n2; DP(0, r; d) = DP(l, 0; d) = 0 for all
d ≥ 1, l = 0, 1, , ..., n1, r = 0, 1, ..., n2.
2: Update: for d = 1, ..., k, l = 2, ..., n1, r = 2, ..., n2:
DP(l, r; d) = T (l − 1, r − 1; d) +∑
e=(Ai,Bj)∈El,r
s.t. i=l or j=r
we ·DP(i− 1, j − 1; d− 1).
3: return DP(n1, n2; k).
5 CARD: A Heuristic Sampling Algorithm
In this section, we propose a heuristic sampling algorithm that implements any given implementable marginal
vector x and potentially achieves high entropy. This algorithm works for general security games (not only
spatio-temporal ones), and is computationally efficient as long as the underlying security game can be solved
efficiently.
At a high level, our idea is to design a randomized implementation for the celebrated Carathéodory’s
theorem, which is about the following existence statement: for any bounded polytope P ⊆ Rn and any
x ∈ P , there exists at most n+ 1 vertices of P such that x can be written as a convex combination of these
vertices. Interpreting P as the convex hull of defender pure strategies, this means any defender mixed strategy,
i.e., a point in P , can be decomposed as a distribution over at most n+ 1 pure strategies (n is the number
of targets). We turn this existence statement into an efficient randomized algorithm, named CArathéodory
Randomized Decomposition (CARD).
Consider any polytope P = {z : Az ≤ b;Mz = c} explicitly represented by polynomially
𝐯" 𝐱
𝐯$
𝒫 𝐴'𝒛 = 𝑏'
Figure 4: CARD Decomposition.
many linear constraints, and any x ∈ P . We use Ai, bi to
denote the i’th row of A and b respectively; Aiz = bi is a
facet of P . Geometrically, CARD randomly picks a vertex
v1 = argmaxz∈P〈a, z〉 for a linear objective a ∈ [0, 1]n chosen
uniformly at random. CARD then “walks along” the ray that
originates from v1 and points to x, until it crosses a facet of
P , denoted by Aiz = bi, at some point v2 (see illustrations in
Figure 4). Thus, x can be decomposed as a convex combination
of v1,v2. CARD then treats v2 as a new x and decompose it
within the facet Aiz = bi recursively until v2 becomes a vertex.
Details are presented in Algorithm 2.
A crucial ingredient of CARD is that each vertex v1 is the optimal vertex solution to a uniformly random
linear objective. Recall that the max-entropy distribution over any given support under no constraints is the
uniform distribution. The intuition underlying CARD is that these randomly selected vertices will inherit the
high entropy of their linear objectives. Notice that the decomposition generated by CARD is different in each
execution due to its randomness, therefore the strategies generated by CARD are sampled from a very large
support.
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Algorithm 2 CARD
Input: P = {z ⊆ Rn : Az ≤ b;Mz = c} and x ∈ P
Output: v1, ...,vk and p1, ..., pk such that
∑k
i=1 pi · vi = x.
1: if rank(M ) = n then
2: Return the unique point v1 in P and p1 = 1.
3: else
4: Choose a ∈ [−1, 1]n uniformly at random
5: Compute v1 = argmaxz∈P〈a, z〉.
6: Compute t = mini:Ai(x−v1)>0
bi−Aixi
Ai(x−v1) ; Let i
∗ be the row obtaining t, and P ′ = {z ∈ P : Ai∗z =
bi∗}.
7: v2 = x+ t(x− v1); p1 = tt+1 , p2 = 11+t .
8: [V ′,p′] = CARD(v2,P ′)
9: return V = (v1, V ′) and p = (p1, p2 × p′).
10: end if
0.01
0.1
1
10
100
1000
5 10 15 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Ti
m
e	  
(s
)
Num	  of	  Targets
MaxEn CARD RigorOPT
(a) Running Time Comparison
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Accurate	  Leak Inaccurate	  Leak Attacker	  
Manipulation
At
t	  U
til
ity
MaxEn CARD RigorOPT
(b) Probabilitic Leakage
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Adversarial	  Leak	   Inaccurate	  Leak Attacker	  
Manipulation
At
t	  U
til
ity
MaxEn CARD RigorOPT
(c) Adversarial Leakage
Figure 5: Comparisons of max-entropy algorithms and the rigorously optimal algorithm.
6 Experimental Evaluations
6.1 Comparisons with Optimal Approach
To our knowledge, [33] is the only work that directly considers the computation of the optimal defender
strategy against a specific leakage model and proposes an exponential time algorithm for a zero-sum security
setting with no resource allocation constraints and one leaking target. They considered two information
leakage models: 1. the defender has a probabilistic belief about the leaking target (probabilistic leakage);
2. the leaking target is adversarially chosen by the attacker to minimize the defender’s utility (adversarial
leakage). These (simpler) settings are not what we focus on, but our algorithms can be applied here. Therefore,
we experimentally test max-entropy algorithms in this setting, with the goal of examining how our approach
performs compared to the rigorously optimal solution of [33], termed RigorOPT,
We compare three algorithms: RigorOPT, MaxEn, and CARD (MaxEn, and CARD are from Section 4
and 5 respectively). All algorithms are implemented by MATLAB 2016 and run on a single machine with
2.7 GHz Intel Core i5 GPU and 8 GB memory. Figure 5(a) compares the running time of these algorithms.
MaxEn and CARD are much more scalable than RigorOPT. Particularly, RigorOPT scales only to 25∼30
targets due to its exponential running time, while MaxEn and CARD can solve instances of 300 targets within
2 minutes in our experiments.
Figure 5(b) and 5(c) compare the solution quality of these algorithms, with a focus on situations with
model misspecification and attacker manipulations. Each column averages over 20 randomly generated
zero-sum games with 20 targets, 6 patrollers and utility drawn from [−10, 10] uniformly at random. Figure
5(b) examines 3 scenarios. The “Accurate Leak” scenario assumes that the defender knows precisely which
target leaks information; The “Inaccurate Leak” scenario assumes that one target leaks information, but the
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defender does not know exactly which one and only has an (inaccurate) probabilistic belief, over which she
optimizes her strategy; The “Attacker Manipulation” scenario assumes that there is no leaking target, but the
attacker misleads the defender to believe that one target leaks information. The y-axis is the attacker utility
– the lower, the better. As we can see, RigorOPT only outperforms MaxEn and CARD in the “Accurate
Leak” scenario (as expected since it is optimal), but is outperformed otherwise. Figure 5(c) is about similar
scenarios but in the adversarial leakage model. Figure 5(b) and 5(c) show the robustness of the max-entropy
algorithms – they are close to optimality when the model is indeed accurate, but are much more robust to
misspecification of leakage models and attacker manipulations than RigorOPT.
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Figure 6: Comparisons of max-entropy and traditional algorithms in STST and FAMS settings.
6.2 Comparisons with Traditional Algorithms in Spatio-Temporal Security Settings
We now experimentally compare MaxEn, CARD with traditional security game algorithms in spatio-temporal
security settings. We are not aware of any previous algorithm that directly computes the optimal defender
strategy against a particular leakage model, therefore the rigorously optimal solution is not available. We
instead use a “harder" BaseLine which is the attacker utility assuming no leakage. This is the best (i.e.,
smallest) possible attacker utility. The most widely used approach for solving large-scale security games is the
column generation technique (a.k.a., strategy/constraint generation [19, 8]). Particularly, we compare MaxEn,
CARD with ColG (the optimal mixed strategy computed via column generation6 assuming no leakage). Note
that all these algorithms use the same marginal vector. The goal is to test their robustness in presence of
information leakage.
All algorithms are tested in two settings: Spatio-Temporal Settings with Two patrollers (STST) and
Federal Air Marshal Scheduling for round-trip flights (FAMS). All algorithms run efficiently (within 2
minutes), so we only compare their solution qualities in term of attacker utilities – the lower, the better.
Unless specifically mentioned, we always assume that the attacker can monitor two randomly chosen targets
at time t=1 and attacks one target at the last time layer T (T=2 in FAMS). All results are averaged over 20
zero-sum security games with utility drawn randomly from [−10, 10]. We test the algorithms on zero-sum
games because they are strictly competitive, therefore any information leaking to the attacker will benefit
the attacker and hurt the defender. However, the effects of the curse of correlation (CoC) could be a mix of
both good and bad in general-sum security games because there, “leaking" information to the attacker could
sometimes be beneficial to the defender. This has been studied in previous work on strategic information
revelation in security games [26, 18]. In zero-sum security games, however, it was formally proved that any
information to the attacker will hurt the defender. In this sense, zero-sum games serve as the best fit for
studying harms of CoC. Previous research [3] studying information leakage in normal-form games has also
focused on zero-sum games. We remark that many security games, including several real-world applications
in spatio-temporal domains[35, 17], are indeed zero-sum.
6The column generation technique is widely used in many security game algorithms. Though some security games use a compact
linear program to directly compute the optimal marginal vector, the ultimate generation of a deployable mixed strategy still requires
strategy generation techniques. In FAMS domain, ColG is precisely the ASPEN algorithm [19] – the leading algorithm today for
scheduling air marshals at scale.
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In all our experiments, MaxEn significantly outperforms ColG; CARD is usually slightly worse than
MaxEn. We therefore mainly focus on analyzing other interesting findings here. Figure 6(a) compares the
algorithms in the STST setting by varying the number of time layers T , but fixing N = 9. Interestingly, when
T increases, MaxEn and CARD approaches the BaseLine, i.e., the lowest possible attacker utility. This
shows that in patrolling strategies of large entropy, the correlation between a patroller’s initial and later moves
gradually disappear as time goes on. This illustrates the validity of max-entropy approach for mitigating
CoC. In Figure 6(b), we fix T = 9, N = 9, and compare the algorithms by varying the number of Monitored
Targets (#MoT). Surprisingly, even when the attacker can monitor 6 out of 9 targets at t = 1, MaxEn and
CARD are still close to BaseLine, while the performance of ColG gradually decrease as #MoT increases.
Figure 6(c) moves to the FAMS setting, and compares all algorithms by varying the deployment-to-
saturation (DtS) ratio [20], which is 2k/n in FAMS (n = 60 in Figure 6(c)). DtS captures the fraction of
targets that can be covered in a pure strategy. It turns out that the higher the DtS ratio is, the worse ColG
performs. This is because, with higher DtS, ColG quickly converges to an optimal mixed strategy with very
small support, since each pure strategy covers many targets. Unfortunately, such a small-support strategy
suffers severely from the curse of correlation. We noted that in FAMS games with 100 targets, MaxEn,
CARD, ColG use 99997, 2199, 53 pure strategies on average (MaxEn samples 100,000 pure strategies in
our experiments, and almost all of them are different).
7 Conclusions
In this paper we formally study the curse of correlation (CoC) phenomenon in security games and show that
it may cause significant loss to the defender if not addressed properly. We believe this study raises some
important caveats regarding the practical use of traditional security game algorithms. To mitigate CoC, we
propose to adopt the defender strategy with maximum entropy, elaborate the advantages of this approach and
systematically justify it by empirical evaluations. Finally, we develop scalable algorithms for computing the
max-entropy defender strategy in well-motivated applications. One important open question is to develop
other methods to address CoC in security games.
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